Abstract-An identity based signature allows users to sign their documents using their private keys and the signature can be verified by any one, using the identity of the signer and public parameters of the system. An aggregate signature scheme is a digital signature scheme which allows aggregation of different signatures by different users on different messages. The primary objective of aggregate signature scheme is to achieve both computational and communication efficiency. Here, we propose an identity based aggregate signature scheme, which uses a variation of light weight Schnorr type identity based signature scheme, where in the signers need not agree upon a common randomness and the aggregation is done without having any kind of interaction among the signers. The scheme is pairing free even for aggregate signature verification. The scheme is computationally efficient because it avoids costly bilinear pairing operation. It should be noted that our signature achieves only partial aggregation because the private key of each user is generated by a randomized extract algorithm and hence a random value is to be propagated with each single signature generated.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many real-life applications handle a collection of signed documents together, rather than handling them individually. It is not hard to visualize such a scenario in Bank transactions, legal document processing (archiving and communicating) in a legal firm, digital attestation related application and so on. In all the above applications, generating, storing and transmitting a large number of signed documents arise naturally. An Aggregate Signature Scheme combines several signatures, say 1 , . . . , , on messages 1 , . . . , , by users 1 , . . . , and produces a single signed document where size of is substantially smaller than the sum of the sizes of 's. This leads to a significant reduction in the communication cost because, it is only required to transmit instead of transmitting 1 , . . . , individually. A similar remark holds good even for storage requirements when is archived instead of 1 , . . . , .
Certificate chains in hierarchical PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) systems consists of various signatures at different levels in the hierarchy. By using aggregate signature one can combine all these signatures and reduce the certificate length. Ordered sequential aggregation is used in communication between routers in a network, where each router receives the data and the signature of the previous router. The current router aggregates its own signature to the previous aggregate signature and routes it to the next router. This aggregated signature can be used to find the path travelled by the data from source to destination by verifying a single aggregate signature. Aggregate signatures can also be used in wireless network scenarios. Since the major constraint in wireless networks is communication complexity, the use of efficient aggregate signature helps in reducing the amount of data to be communicated.
Identity based aggregate signatures are considered to be more effective than PKI based aggregation because in the formar, only identities (which are very short when compared to group elements) of the signers have to be sent along with the aggregate signatures for signature verification. In PKI based system, efficient aggregation can be done but the identities, public keys and the certificates of the public keys of the signers (issued by the Certifying Authority) has to be send along with the aggregate signature. The signatures and certificates can be easily aggregated in PKI based system but then there is no known technique to aggregate the public keys. Many well known PKI based aggregate signatures are available in the literature [11] , [1] , [2] , [10] . However, as the focus of this paper is on identity based aggregate signature scheme, we will not compare the PKI based schemes with our scheme. To the best of our knowledge, there are four provably secure identity based aggregate signature schemes [6] , [13] , [7] and [3] . It should be noted that all of them use bilinear pairing during the verification process. An identity based aggregate signature achieves partial aggregation if a part of the signature, namely the part with the secret key component of signers is fully aggregated and the randomness part is propagated without aggregation. If both the parts in the signature are fully aggregated then the scheme is said to achieve full aggregation. We provide a brief survey about the efficiency and weakness of various identity based aggregate signature schemes.
Our contribution:
In this paper, we propose an identity based aggregate signature scheme whose key generation is similar to Javier Herranz's identity based partial aggregate signature scheme [7] . Our scheme does not require bilinear pairing operation during aggregate signature verification. This is because the individual signature generated by our scheme is a Schnorr-like signature. As in [7] , our schemes do not have interaction among the signers before aggregate signature generation which reduces the communication complexity to a large extent. However, this scheme achieves only partial aggregation (as defined by Javier Herranz [7] ). This is because both the extract algorithm and the signature generation algorithm are randomized. We formally prove the security of our scheme in the random oracle model.
II. COMPUTATIONAL ASSUMPTION
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Let ( , * ) be a multiplicative group of order ; ∈ be a generator of and ℎ = ∈ for some unknown ∈ ℤ . Given and ℎ, the discrete logarithm problem is to find .
An algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving
III. GENERIC MODEL
An identity based aggregate signature scheme (IBAS) consists of the following six algorithms.
• Setup: The private key generator (PKG) provides the security parameter as the input to this algorithm, generates the system parameters and the master private key
. PKG publishes and keeps secret.
• ", else outputs " ".
• Token Generation: In some models of identity based systems, the PKG may generate a random value that corresponds to the registered user at the time of registration / key generation. This value will be made public by the user. We refer this value as 'token' and tokens are not used for any encryption schemes. These tokens will always be send as a part of the signature. This extended version of identity based signatures is not considered as violation because this token is used only for signing purpose. More on this have been discussed in section V. Important Remark: As encryption algorithms only use the publicly known identities of the user alone as public key, tokens are never used in encryption schemes. Since ours is an identity based signature scheme, introduction of token in our cryptosystem is not a violation of the definition of identity based system.
IV. SECURITY MODEL

A. Unforgeability
Gentry et al. in [6] proposed a formal model for aggregate signature scheme. Their scheme used a common randomness. We follow the security model proposed by Gentry et al. with slight variations since we do not have a common random value. An IBAS scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive-chosen-identity and adaptive-chosen-message attack if no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm has non-negligible advantage in the following game.
• Setup phase: The challenger runs the setup algorithm and generates the and . Challenger gives to adversary .
• Training phase: After the setup, starts interacting with by querying the various oracles provided by in the following way:
-KeyGen oracle: When makes a query with , outputs , the private key of to , provided knows the private key for the queried identity. Else it aborts. -Signing oracle: When makes a signing query with , message , outputs a valid signature on by .
• Forgery phase: outputs an aggregate signature for signatures ( ) =1 from the users ( ) =1 on messages ( ) =1 where there exists at least one target identity ∈ { } =1 , for which private key has not been queried for. The adversary wins the game if is a valid aggregate signature and has not queried for the signature from the signing oracle for ( , ) pair on which it has generated the forgery.
Normally, the public key of a user in identity based cryptography is obtained by hashing the user's identity, which uniquely identifies the user. In the identity based signature by Galindo et al. [5] , we find an interesting and subtle difference between all existing schemes and [5] . In [5] , Galindo et al. have used a Schnorr signature which uses a purely random value chosen by the PKG to generate the private key of the user. This random value can be interpreted as a 'token' which we discussed in section III on generic model of identity based aggregate signature scheme. This token along with the identity of the user is hashed together to obtain the public key corresponding the user. It should be noted that this is not a violation of the property of identity based cryptosystem with respect to digital signature schemes because, in a digital signature scheme all the components of a signature on an arbitrary message are generated by the signer who is in possession of the private key. Hence, the signer has to send the random value obtained with his private key from the PKG along with each signature he generates. The interesting part is that, if the signer or any potential forger tries to alter the random value obtained from the PKG for the signer, both will fail miserably in generating a valid signature because neither signer nor the forger will be able to generate a valid private key corresponding to the altered random value. We emphasize again that tokens can never be used for encryption schemes and can always be used in signature schemes. In Galindo et al.'s [5] paper, the component is send by the PKG to the user. This component is called as 'token' in our convention. Important Remark: Similar kind of key constructs for identity based cryptosystem can be seen in [4] , [7] and [9] . In [4] , an identity based key agreement protocol was proposed by Dario et al., in [7] a deterministic aggregate signature scheme was proposed by Javier Herranz and in [9] an identity based online/offline signature was proposed by Liu et al.. In this section, we describe a new identity based aggregate signature scheme based on the identity based signature scheme by Galindo et al. [5] . This scheme consists of six algorithms which are described below.
• IBAS.Setup: Let be the security parameter of the system. Let be a multiplicative group of order . Choose ∈ . Choose three cryptographic hash functions which are defined as 1 : {0,
* be the master private key and the master public key is set to be . The public parameters are =⟨ , , , 1 , 2 , 3 ⟩ and the master private key is kept secret.
• IBAS.KeyGen: The user provides his identity to the Private Key Generator (PKG). The PKG performs the following with an identity , system parameter and master private key as inputs to generate the user private key:
The PKG sends ⟨ , , ⟩ securely to the user . The user keeps the as secret. Here is called the token and is used to compute . Remark: It is to be noted that the private key is a Schnorr signature on the identity and thus a user who is capable of producing another private key ′ for the same identity or a private key ′′ for an arbitrary identity ′′ can effectively forge the underlying Schnorr signature. As a consequence, the private key generated by the PKG is secure and cannot be generated by any one by altering the token value, unless he knows the master private key . Therefore, we do not consider token as a separate entity for the formal proof of unforgeability of our scheme.
• IBAS.Sign: The user who wishes to sign a message gives his , private key and as input to this algorithm. The algorithm does the following to generate the signature:
is also a component of the signature. Thus, the verifier need to know only the identity of the signer to perform verification.
• IBAS.Verify: Any one can run this verification algorithm.
The verifier provides ⟨ , , ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 ⟩, , and as input to this algorithm. The verification is done as follows:
-Check whether:
and
" if both the verifications pass, else output " ". -Check whether the equation
Correctness of the computation of :
holds. If all the above checks hold good, output " " else output " ".
Correctness of the IBAS.AggregateVerify algorithm:
.
= This shows that the aggregate verification test is correct and consistent.
VI. SECURITY PROOF FOR IBAS
In this section, we prove the security of our identity based aggregate signature scheme (IBAS). We show that if a polynomial time bounded adversary exists who can break our scheme with non-negligible probability ′ then we will be able to solve the discrete logarithm problem with non-negligible probability 0 . We prove that our scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message and adaptive chosen identity attack. We also use the oracle replay attack technique and forking lemma [12] to prove the security of our scheme. Proof: The adversary in adaptive chosen message and adaptive chosen identity attack has access to all the hash oracles, the signing oracle and the key extract oracle. The Challenger uses the forgery by to solve the computational hard problem (DLP) with the help of oracle replay technique.
is given an instance of the DL problem i.e given ,ℎ = ∈ for some unknown , the discrete logarithm problem is to find . The game between and is as follows: Setup Phase:
chooses a group and a generator for the group . Then, chooses a random ∈ * and calculates . has all the three hash oracles 1 , 2 , 3 under his control. So he gives the public parameters = will not know which identity is set as the target identity because does not know the strategy for selecting the target identity.
should have asked for at least one query of this kind since has to to know the public parameter of a particular . The only other way for to know the corresponding to is through the private key extract queries. Let the maximum number of queries of this kind to 1 oracle be * as signature on by Although the signature ⟨ , , ℎ 1 , ℎ 2 ⟩ was not generated using the actual signing algorithm. The signature generated is valid due to the following fact:
as a valid signature. There is no need to provide an aggregate oracle since the user can query the signing oracle repeatedly and do the aggregation himself. has not asked for a signature query on the corresponding ⟨ , ⟩ pair to the oracle (i.e it is not a trivial forgery). The adversary will be able to do this forgery with a probability of ′ which is expressed as follows:
Let the advantage of the adversary breaking the scheme in existential forgery under chosen target identity and adaptive chosen message. The places where the algorithm can abort are
• In extract case if the adversary asks for the extract query for the then the algorithm aborts. is the maximum number of extract queries which the adversary can ask. Then the probability that he has not asked for any extract query for is
where
is the maximum number of 1 of type 2 allowed for the adversary.
• After the forgery the algorithm may abort if the adversary has not used as one of the identities of the signers or if has used a for the signature of for which it has already asked the signing query. The probability that produces a valid forgery is [ = for some = 1, . . . , and
Combining the two probabilities we get the advantage of the adversary breaking our scheme in adaptive chosen message and adaptive chosen identity attack is given by
will be able to produce a valid signature without knowing the secret key of the signer with probability
as shown in [12] . Our signature scheme has parameters similar to those used in [12] . The component in our signature is a randomness component corresponding to 1 in [12] . We use the randomness in our hash 2 and 3 . The signature component is analogous to 2 in [12] which uses both the hash values and randomness. Since the construct has similar components as pointed out by Pointcheval we can use forking lemma in our proof. By using forking lemma plays again with with same random tape and 2 oracle but different 3 oracle. Then with a probability ′′ ≥ 1 9 , the adversary will be able to produce another valid aggregate signature for the set of users. That aggregate signature will be of the form
⟩ where all 's are same as previous signature. using the two valid aggregate signatures does the following:
knows all the private keys other than the target identity's private key. also know all the hash values. Thus by dividing the final equation by (ℎ 2 − ℎ ′ 2 ) get . But knows that = + . Thus the value of + is determined above. know and . Thus from the computed value of + , if subtracts , can find the value of which is the solution for the given instance of the discrete logarithm problem, since = as per definition. The total probability by which the challenger will be able to solve the Discrete logarithm problem is given by Hence we have proved that if a polynomial time bounded adversary exists who can break our scheme with a non-negligible probability 0 then can solve the discrete logarithm problem with non-negligible probability as shown. Thus our scheme is secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen message and adaptive chosen identity attack. □
VII. EFFICIENCY COMPARISON:
In Table 1 we compare the efficiency of our schemes with few existing schemes. We also give some remarks on the efficiency and merits of our schemes over others.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered an identity based signature in which the private key for a user is a Schnorr signature on his identity. This private key is generated by the PKG. Besides, the PKG sends a random 'token' to every user along with his private key. This token cannot be altered by the user and the token can never be used in any identity based encryption scheme. Since, for encryption schemes, only identities are used as public keys. The presence of tokens in the scheme is not a violation to the definition of identity based scheme. However, the concept of 'token' can be cleverly deployed to avoid all pairing based computations in aggregate signature schemes. We have demonstrated that Galindo et al's [5] signature scheme which uses the concept of 'tokens' can be used to design an aggregate signature scheme without pairing.
We have addressed the open problem posed by Hwang et al. in [8] , which is to design an identity based aggregate signature scheme where the signers need not have to agree on a fresh nonce in advance and do not require a common nonce. Thus an identity based aggregate signature scheme in a non-interactive environment. We have proposed an identity based aggregate signature schemes which uses a variant of schnorr signature, with no pairing operation, which is the first aggregate scheme without pairing, achieves partial aggregation and satisfies the afore mentioned property. We have formally proved the security of the scheme in the random oracle model.
